researchers uncovered fraudulent apps on Google Play that claim to provide the call history “for any number” and had been downloaded more than seven million times before being taken down
There’s an app for everything nowadays… right? Well, looking up call records for a phone number of choice is not one of those things, as potentially millions of Android users found out after paying for app subscriptions promising just that.
The offending apps, which we named CallPhantom based on their false claims, purport to provide access to call histories, SMS records, and even WhatsApp call logs for any phone number. To unlock this supposed feature, users are asked to pay – but all they get in return is randomly generated data.
Our investigation identified 28 such fraudulent apps available on the Google Play store, cumulatively downloaded more than 7.3 million times. As an App Defense Alliance partner, we reported our findings to Google, which removed all of the apps identified in this report from Google Play.
Key points of this blogpost:
- A new Android scam, CallPhantom, falsely claims to provide access to call logs, SMS records, and WhatsApp call history for any phone number in exchange for payment.
- We identified and reported 28 CallPhantom apps on Google Play, cumulatively downloaded more than 7.3 million times.
- Some CallPhantom apps sidestep Google Play’s official billing system, complicating victims’ refund efforts.
Investigation
In November 2025, we came across a Reddit post discussing an app named Call History of Any Number, found on Google Play. The app, shown in Figure 1, claims that it can retrieve the call history of any phone number supplied by the user. It was published under the developer name Indian gov.in, but the app has no real association with the Indian government.
Unsurprisingly, our analysis showed that the “call history” data provided by this app is entirely fabricated – the app generates random phone numbers and matches them with fixed names, call times, and call durations, which were embedded directly in the code, as shown in Figure 2. This fake data is then presented to victims – but only after payment.
A screenshot of the fabricated call history data was even included in the app’s listing, presented as a demonstration of the app’s functionality, as shown in Figure 3.
Further research revealed additional, related apps available on the Play Store – 28 CallPhantom apps altogether. We reported the full set of fraudulent apps to Google on December 16th, 2025. At the time of publication, all the reported apps have been removed from the store.
Despite visual differences, which can be seen in Figure 4 and Figure 5, the purpose of the apps is identical: generate fake communication data and charge victims for access. The table in the Analyzed CallPhantom apps section lists each app along with its key details, including the download count.
Campaign overview
The CallPhantom apps we found on Google Play mainly targeted Android users in India and the broader Asia‑Pacific region. Many of the apps came with India’s +91 country code preselected and support UPI, a payment system used primarily in India.
The apps had garnered numerous negative reviews, with victims reporting that they were scammed and never received the promised data, as can be seen in Figure 6.
It is not clear how the apps were distributed or promoted. Presumably, by seemingly offering insight into private information, the scammers successfully took advantage of people’s curiosity. Combined with a few glowing (fake) reviews, it might have seemed like an intriguing offer.
CallPhantom overview
In our investigation, we identified two main clusters of these fraudulent apps.
The apps in the first cluster contain hardcoded names, country codes, and templates in their code, as shown in Figure 7. These are combined with randomly generated phone numbers and shown to the user as partial “results”. To view the full (fake) history, the victim has to pay.
The apps in the second cluster ask users to enter an email address where the “retrieved” call history would supposedly be delivered, as seen in the screenshots in Figure 8. No data generation occurs until after payment; users have to pay or subscribe before any email would supposedly be sent.
In general, CallPhantom apps have a simple user interface and do not request any intrusive or sensitive permissions – they don’t need to. Coincidentally, they do not contain any functionality capable of retrieving real call, SMS, or WhatsApp data.
In the CallPhantom apps we analyzed, we saw three different payment methods used, the latter two of which are in violation of Google Play’s payments policy.
First, some of the apps relied on subscriptions via Google Play’s official billing system. This is required of apps offering in-app purchases, per Google Play’s payments policy; such purchases are covered by Google’s refund protection.
Second, some of the apps relied on payments via third-party apps that support UPI. For these third-party payment apps, CallPhantom apps either included hardcoded URLs or fetched the URLs dynamically from a Firebase realtime database, meaning the payment account could be changed at any time by the operator.
Third, in some cases, payment card checkout forms were included directly in the CallPhantom apps.
Examples of the payment methods can be seen in Figure 9.
In one case, we observed an additional tactic used to coax the user into paying: if the user exited the app without payment, the app displayed deceptive alerts styled as new emails claiming that the call history results had arrived – see Figure 10. Clicking the notification led straight to a subscription screen.
The fees requested for the fake service differ widely across the apps. The apps also appear to offer different subscription packages, such as weekly, monthly, or yearly services, with the highest requested price sitting at US$80. For the lowest “subscription tier”, the average requested price was €5.
What to do if you have been scammed
In general, subscriptions purchased through the official Google Play billing system can be canceled in the Play Store app by tapping your profile icon, navigating to Payments & subscriptions → Subscriptions, selecting the active subscription, and tapping Cancel subscription. Google explains the full process on its Cancel, pause, or change a subscription on Google Play page.
For the 28 apps described in this blogpost, existing subscriptions have been canceled when the apps were removed from Google Play.
In some cases, refunds for Google Play purchases are possible. Google may issue a refund depending on the time since purchase, the type of item, and its refund policy. In general, requests must be made within the allowed refund window as described on Google’s support page.
If the purchase was made outside Google Play – for example, by entering payment card details inside the app or by paying through third‑party services – then Google cannot cancel the subscription or issue a refund, and users have to contact the payment provider or the app developer directly.
Conclusion
We identified a new cluster of fraudulent Android apps on Google Play that collectively amassed over 7.3 million downloads before being taken down upon notification by ESET. These apps, which we collectively named CallPhantom, falsely promise to retrieve call logs, SMS records, and WhatsApp call history for any phone number, a technically impossible claim designed solely to exploit people’s curiosity and mislead them into paying.
Many of the apps circumvented Google Play’s official billing system, pushing users toward third‑party payments or direct card entry, complicating refund efforts and exposing victims to financial risk.
Our analysis revealed that the “results” shown to victims are entirely fabricated, often using hardcoded Indian numbers, predefined names, and generated timestamps disguised as real communication data.
Users who subscribed via official Google Play billing may be eligible for refunds under Google’s refund policies. Purchases made via third‑party payment apps or through direct payment card entry cannot be refunded by Google, leaving users dependent on external payment providers or developers.
